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NOTES
Securities Regulation—Shares of Nonprofit Cooperative Housing
Developments as Securities—United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Fortnani —Co-op City is a state-subsidized, low and middle income
cooperative housing development located in New York City.' The
buildings and land constituting this mammoth development 3 are
owned and operated by Riverbay Corporation [Riverbay], a nonprofit
cooperative housing corporation. 4
 Riverbay was organized by United
Housing Foundation [UHF], a nonprofit membership corporation
comprised of labor unions, housing cooperatives and civic groups,
which was responsible for initiating and sponsoring the development
of Co-op City. 5 Community Services, Inc. [CSI], a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of UHF, served as general contractor and sales agent for the
project.°
In order to acquire housing in Co-op City, an eligible prospec-
tive tenant' was required to purchase, at twenty-five dollars per share,
eighteen shares of Riverbay "stock" for each apartment room
desired.° These shares could only be owned by actual or prospective
occupants of Co-op City apartments. Furthermore, the shares could
be neither transferred, pledged, nor encumbered; upon death of the
owner they descended, along with the apartment, only to a surviving
spouse. The shares did not carry any voting rights; instead, each
apartment was entitled to one vote.° Tenants were assessed monthly
rental charges based on apartment size, type, and location, rather
than on the number of shares owned." If a tenant vacated the
apartment," Riverbay was entitled to the right of first refusal of his
shares at the tenant's initial purchase price." If Riverbay did not re-
' 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
2 Id. Co-op City. was built pursuant to New York's Mitchell-Lama Act, N.Y. PRIV,
Haus. FIN. LAW §§ 10-37 (McKinney 1962), as amended, (Supp. 1975-76), which was de-
signed to alleviate the scarcity of decent, low-income urban housing by encouraging
private developers to build low-cost cooperatNe housing. Id. 11. Conditioned upon
state supervision, inducements such as large, long-term, low-interest loans, id. 22, local
property tax exemptions, id. § 33, and the power of condemnation by the state or
municipality, id. 29, were offered by the Act.
3 Co-op City covers 200 acres containing 35 high-rise buildings and 236 town-
houses which house approximately 50,000 persons. 421 U.S. at 840.
4 1d. at 841.
Id. n.2.
a Id. at 841-42.
Eligible families or individuals were those whose monthly income was less than
six times the monthly rental charge, or, for families of four or more, less than seven
times that charge. N.Y. l'siv. Hous. FIN, LAW § 31.2(a) (McKinney Supp. 1975-76). Pref-
erence was given to veterans, id. 31.7., the handicapped, and the elderly, id. § 31.8.
*421 U.S. at 842.
Id.
"Id. at 843.
" A tenant could terminate his occupancy voluntarily or could be forced to move
if he violated provisions of the lease or if his income had grown to exceed the eligibility
standards. Id. at 842 n.5.
"Id. at 842-43. A special fund of approximately one million dollars had been es-
tablished to insure that Riverbay would be able to repurchase the shares. Thus far,
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purchase the shares, the tenant could then sell them only to another
eligible prospective tenant at a price equal to the original purchase
price plus' a fraction of the mortgage principal paid during the
tenancy.' 3
Plaintiffs, fifty-seven residents of Co-op City, brought an action
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York on behalf of themselves and all other residents alleging, inter
alia, various violations of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act
of l933," the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 55
 [hereinafter the Se-
curities Acts], and Rule 10b-5" in connection with the offer and sale
of the shares which they had purchased in Riverbay." The principal
defendants—Riverbay, UHF, and CSI"—were alleged to have made
certain material misrepresentations and omissions in the Co-op. City
Information Bulletin, a circular which described and promoted the
project." Plaintiffs sought reduction of monthly rental charges,
money damages, and other appropriate relief. 2 °
To invoke the protection of the antifraud provisions of the Se-
curities Acts, plaintiffs were required to establish that the Riverbay
shares were within the statutory definition of a security. The defini-
tional section of the 1934 Act provides in pertinent part that "unless
the context otherwise requires," security includes any "stock [or] in-
vestment contract."" The district court granted the defendants' mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that a
share in such a cooperative was not a "security" as defined by the
every family that has withdrawn from the project has had its shares repurchased by the
corporation. Id. n.6.
15 N.Y. PRIV. Hons. FIN. LAW 3i-a (McKinney Supp. 1975-76).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
15
 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) ( 1970).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10-b5 (1975).
" Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Plaintiffs also claimed a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) by the State of New York
and the State Housing Finance Agency and advanced several pendent state claims. Id.
at 1 120 & n.4. These claims, however, are not relevant to the issues discussed in this
note.
" Also named as defendants were the State of New York, the New York State
Housing Finance Agency, which financed the development, and certain individual of-
ricers and directors of the defendant organizations. 421 U.S. at 844.
Plaintiffs claimed that the Information Bulletin falsely represented that CSI
would bear any subsequent cost increases due to factors such as inflation. They further
alleged unlawful omission of the following facts: (I) UHF and CSI had failed to adhere
to cost estimates in previous Mitchell-Lama projects; (2) CSI was a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of UHF; (3) due to its small net worth, CSI could not have been legally held to
complete its contract within the original estimates; and (4) the State Housing Commis-
sioner had waived his own rules regarding liquidity requirements in approving CSI as
the contractor. Id. at 844.4 n.8.
" Id. at 844.
2 ' 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(l0) (1970). The 1933 Act defines a security in virtually iden-
tical terms. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970). See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 335-36
(1967).
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Securities Acts."
Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed, 23 basing its decision upon two alternative grounds.
First, the court held that the shares constituted "stock" within the
statutory definition since they were literally denominated by the
defendants as such. 24 Second, the court determined that the transac-
tion was an "investment contract" within' the language of the Se-
curities Acts' definitional sections, since the transaction in question in-
volved a " 'scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise [and is led to expect profits] solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party.' "25
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 20 Reversing the court of
appeals in a 6-3 decision, the Court HELD: Shares of a nonprofit
cooperative housing corporation are not securities within the defini-
tion of the federal Securities Acts when purchased without a reason-
able expectation of profit. 27 In  reaching its decision, the Court first
rejected the "literal approach"" taken by the court of appeals—that
interests termed "stock" are automatically securities under the defini-
tional sections of the Securities Acts." Next, the Court held that the
transaction did not constitute an "investment contract" since there was
no reasonable expectation of profit by the plaintiffs; their purpose in
purchasing the shares was to acquire low cost residential housing for
personal use rather than to invest with the expectation of a monetary
return. 30The significaace  of the Forman decision lies in the Court's re-
jection of a literal approach in interpreting the definitional sections of
the Securities Acts and in the Court's refusal to construe monetary
savings as profit for purposes of defining an investment contract. By
adopting a policy of examining the primary motivation" for a puta-
tive investor's actions and by limiting the concept of profit to a return
on an investment that is capable of liquidation, 32 the Court rejected
" Forman v, Community Servs., Inc. 366 F. Supp. 1117, 1120-21 (S.D,N.Y.
1973). The state parties had moved to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity.
Due to the disposition of the case, neither the district court, .see id. at 1132 ; nor the
Supreme Court, 421 .U.S. at 860 n.27, reached this issue.
23 Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1248 (2d Cir. 1974).
24 Id. at 1252.
" See id. at 1253-59, quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
The court of appeals also found that sovereign immunity had been expressly waived
under N.Y. PRIV. HOUS. FIN. LAW § 32.5.(f) (McKinney Supp. 1975-76) by both the State
and the State Housing Finance Agency, and that the Eleventh Amendment did not pro-
tect a state voluntarily entering a field already under federal regulation. 500 F.2d at
1255-56. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
29 419 U.S, 1120 (1975).
" 421 U.S. at 858-60.
2° Id, at 848.
"Id. See text at notes 23-24 supra.
3°
 421 U.S. at 858.
31 Id.
12 Id. at 855,
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what would appear to be an improper expansion of the definition of a
security.
This note will briefly trace the factors which led to the adoption
of the Securities Acts and examine the manner in which the current
interpretation of the statutory definition of a "security" has evolved.
The Court's holding in Forman will then be discussed in light of this
background. Particular attention will be given first to the Court's re-
jection of the literal approach to statutory interpretation. Next, the
criteria for determining the existence of an investment contract will be
discussed, with special attention given to the Court's interpretation of
the profit requirement. It will be submitted that the Forman holding is
consistent with the statutory language, congressional intent, current
administrative rulings, and leading court decisions.
The legislative history of the Securities Acts reveals that Con-
gress was concerned with regulating manipulative and speculative
practices and with curbing the various investment abuses that contrib-
uted to the ruinous depression of the Thirties. 33 Passed in the af-
termath of the 1929 stock market crash, the Securities Acts were in-
tended to protect the interests of both investors and the general pub-
lic by requiring certain disclosures and by prohibiting fraud and ma-
nipulative practices." To protect the investor, Congress focused on
curbing stock market manipulation, margin abuses, and the reckless
stock market gambling of small investors who were lured by "promises
of easy wealth [which] were freely made with little or no attempt to
bring to the investor's attention those facts essential to estimating the
worth of any security."35
 To protect the nation's enterprises and
economy, Congress focused on the changing proportion of invest-
ments made in liquid securities" and on the fact that this "easy li-
quidity of the resources in which wealth is invested is a danger rather
than a prop to the stability of [the economic] system. When everything
everyone owns can be sold at once, there must be confidence not to
sell,"37
In effectuating this protective spirit, Congress provided for the
regulation of securities transactions and purposely defined the term
"security" in "sufficiently broad and general terms so as to include
within that definition the many types of instruments that in our com-
mercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security." 38 Specifi-
cally, the definition includes any "stock" or "investment contract." 38
33 See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. REP. No, 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); and H.R. REP, No.
85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
" See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
35 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
36 H.R. REP, No, 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934).
37 Id. at 5.
" H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933).
" Securities Act of 1933, 15. U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(I) (1970).
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Congress also indicated, however, that it did not intend to extend
federal regulation to those instruments "not regarded in the commer-
cial world as securities offered to the public for investment
purposes."''" The commercial context of a particular instrument,
therefore, may require that it not be construed as a security.
The Supreme Court has held that a share of stock evidence
a certificate which gives the holder the right to receive payments of
dividends contingent upon apportionment of profits constitutes a se-
curity under the Securities Acts.'" The Court has also indicated, how-
ever, that restrictions on the traditional characteristics associated with
stock—negotiability, ability to be pledged or hypothecated, conferral
of voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned, and
possibility of appreciation 42—will not necessarily cause a transaction
to avoid classification as a security. 42 Thus, the Court has adopted a
policy of examining the substance instead of the form of a particular
instrument. Indeed, the Court in Forman expressly subscribed to the
policy that " 'form should be disregarded for substance and the em-
phasis should be on economic reality., ”.14
Although Congress did not specifically define "investment con-
tract," that term was in wide use in state blue sky laws when Congress
enacted its scheme of remedial legislation.'" Its well-settled construc-
tion was that of a transaction which involved "[t]he placing of capital
or laying out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit
from its employment ...."46 The Supreme Court's first interpretation
of,"investment contract" was a modification of the states' interpreta-
tion. In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp.' promoters sold assignments
of leases to land believed to contain oil deposits and coupled such
sales with an agreement to drill test wells on the leased land." When
the SEC sought to restrain alleged violations of the Securities Act of
1933, the promoters argued that the transactions were not covered by
the Act." The Court found that the contracts for the exploratory dril-
lings imparted to the transactions most of their value and all of their
lure.""" Since the promoters were offering the economic inducement
of the exploratory well drillings, the investors were paying both for a
lease and for the development of the land. The Court reasoned that
in determining the scope of the Securities Acts, "[n]ovel, uncommon,
4 " H.R. REP, No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1938).
41 Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 339 (1967).
45 See 421 U.S. at 851.
"See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972);
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
" 421 U.S. at 848, quoting Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
45 SEC v	 Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
" Id., citing State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937,
938 (1920).
" 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
"Id. at 345-46,
"Id. at 350.
"Id. at 349.
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or irregular devices ... are also reached if ... they were widely of-
fered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which established
their character in commerce as Investment contracts ....' "51
 Holding
that this transaction did constitute an "investment contract," the Court
stated that rather than being guided by the nature of the assets be-
hind a particular document or offering, the proper test should in-
quire as to the "character the instrument is given in commerce by the
terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic induce-
ments held out to the prospect." 52
Three years later, in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 53 the Court refined
its definition of an "investment contract." In Howey, the Court held
that the offering of units of a citrus grove development coupled with
a contract for cultivating, marketing, and remitting the net proceeds
to the investor constituted an "investment contract" under the Se-
curities Act of 1933. 54 The Court stated that an "investment contract"
exists where there is "a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. . . . "55 Noting
that this test was the foundation of its decision in Joiner," the Court
reasoned that such a test could be adapted to meet the variety of
schemes devised by "those who seek the use of the money of others
on the promise of profits." 57 Therefore, an investment contract could
exist where an enterprise was not speculative in nature and where
"the tangible interest which is sold has intrinsic value independent of
the success of the enterprise as a whole." 59
In determining whether an investment contract exists, the Su-
preme Court has applied the Howey test without modification since its
inception. 59 This test, however, has been criticized by commentators as
not being faithful to joiner in its shift in focus from economic
inducements offered by promoters, to profit expectations of
purchasers,9 ° as well as for its focus on the profit which the investor
anticipates rather than on the risk which he assumes." Recognizing
that the element of profit in the Howey test demands a money return
over and above the initial investment, commentators have also criti-
51 Id. at 351.
" Id. at 352-53 (emphasis added).
63 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
" Id. at 295, 299-300.
" Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
" Id,
" Id.
" Id. at 301.
50 See, e.g., Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967).
6° Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful For-
mula?, 18 WEST. Res. L. REV. 367, 381-82 (1967).
6 ' Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Fed-
eral Securities, 25 HAsT L. J. 219, 241-49 (1973); Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment
Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA, L. REV. 135, 167-70 (1971);
Coffey, supra note 60, at 367.
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cized limey as giving inadequate attention to cases where an invest-
ment is made to capitalize a venture with the expectation of a non-
monetary economic benefit."
An approach which does focus on the risk to investors has been
adopted by the California Supreme Court. In Silver Hills Country Club
v. Sobieski, 63 Justice Traynor interpreted definitional sections of the
California blue sky laws," which were similar to the federal Securities
Acts, to include schemes where investors risked their capital with the
expectation of receiving some type of general economic benefit." In
Silver Hills, the purchasers provided the capital for the construction of
a country club in exchange- for membership in the club which in-
cluded. the right to use the club's facilities." The court reasoned that
only by risking their capital along with others could the investors have
a chance that the benefits of club membership would materialize. The
court stated that the objective of the securities law was to afford those
who risk their capital at least a fair chance of realizing their objectives
whether they expect a return on their capital in one form or
another."
The definition of "investment contract" has also developed
through SEC pronouncements, particularly with regard to housing
cooperatives. In Securities Act Release 33-5347," specific guidelines
were set out to clarify whether offers of interests in condominiums or
housing cooperatives constitute securities. Under these guidelines, an
offering will be considered an "investment contract" if it includes: (1)
a rental arrangement emphasizing the economic benefits to the
purchaser to come from managerial efforts of a third party or the
promoter; (2) a rental pooling arrangement;" or (3) an arrangement
whereby the purchaser is required to keep his unit available for rental
for part of the year or to use an exclusive rental agent, or is otherwise
materially restricted in the use of his unit. 70 Where income-generating
commercial facilities are part of a residential project, the conclusion
that an investment contract exists is not required, provided the in-
come from these facilities is used only to offset common area ex-
penses and the facilities are not established as a primary source of in-
come for the individual owners, but are merely incidental to the
project,' [ The SEC, therefore, appears to have distinguished those
62 Long, supra note 61, at 174-75;Colfey, supra note 60, at 377-78.
" 55 Cal.2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961).
64 CAL. Cour. CODE 25008 (West 1955), as amended, § 25019 (Supp. 1975).
65
 55 CaL2d at 815-16, 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
"Id. at 812-13, 361 P.2d at 906-07, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 186-87.
47 1d. at 8l5-l6. 361 P.2d at 908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 188-89.
68 38 Fed. Reg. 1735 (1973).
" In a typical rental pool, a promoter undertakes to rent units not being used by
their owners. The rents received and the expenses of rental are combined and each in-
dividual owner receives a pro rata share of the profits regardless of whether his unit
was actually rented. Id. at 1736.
"Id.
" Id.
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types of housing units purchased for personal use from those that are
sold with an emphasis on the investment benefits to the purchaser."
Against this background, the Court in Forman was confronted
with the question of whether the shares of Riverbay stock fell within
the scope of the Securities Acts' definition of a security. Under the
definitional sections, it was necessary for the Court to examine specifi-
cally whether the shares constituted either "stock" or "investment con-
tracts." In considering whether the shares were "stock," the Court re-
jected the literal approach" adopted by the court of appeals—that in-
struments denominated "stock" automatically fall within the statutory
definition." The Court reasoned that such a mechanical reading of
the statutory definitions would violate well-settled canons of statutory
construction." As early as 1892, the Court had stated: "[i]t is a famil-
iar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet
not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the in-
tention of its makers.""
In adopting the literal approach, the court of appeals had mis-
takenly relied on dictum from Joiner that "[i]nstruments may be in-
cluded within any of these definitions, as matter of law, if on their face
they answer to the name or description."" The Forman Court stated
that this reliance was misplaced, reasoning that the Joiner Court was
merely observing that most instruments using the traditional term
"stock" are likely to be covered by the Securities Acts. 78 The Forman
Court was quick to note that in Joiner, the Court had in fact examined
the underlying economic reality of the transaction before finding that
a security existed."
The Supreme Court's rejection of the literal approach in Forman
appears to be consistent with a faithful reading of the Securities Acts
" The SEC's first pronouncement (Dec. 16, 1960) in this area was an exemption
from registration of certain "[s]tock or other securities representing membership in any
cooperative housing corporation ..." if the principal activity of the corporation is the
"ownership, leasing, management or construction of residential properties for its mem-
bers ...." 17 C.F.R. § 230.235 (1975). It could be argued that this rule implies that all
cooperative shares are otherwise included under Securities Acts coverage. This argu-
ment, however, has been characterized by Prof. Loss as "too facile." 1 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REcut.krtoNs 493-94 (2d ed. 1961). It has been suggested that "[a) more
plausible argument is that an exemptive rule was a convenient means for the Commis-
sion to avoid the cooperative housing regulation issue." Recent Development, 62 Gm.
L.J. 1515, 1527 n.62 (1974). If the exemption is read as covering only interests in
cooperative units that already meet the definition of a "security," the rule is then
consistent with Release 33-5347.
" 421 U.S. at 848.
" Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252 (2d Cir. 1974).
" 421 U.S. at 849.
" Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). See
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), affd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945), where
Judge Learned Hand noted that it is an error "to make a fortress out of the dictionary
"Joiner, 320 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
" 421 U.S. at 849-50.
" Id, See fointr, 320 U.S. at 355.
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and prior court decisions. Lower courts recently confronted with the
issue have held that the literal approach is not valid in considering
whether security status attaches to a particular transaction.B° At least
one circuit court has interpreted the language of the definitional sec-
tions as mandating an inquiry beyond the face of an instrument to de-
termine whether a security exists," since the named instrument may
not constitute a security if "the context otherwise requires."" This
conclusion is well-founded. The literal approach would lead to absurd
and anomalous results where, for example, an interest otherwise not
within the scope of the Securities Acts would be included as a security
merely by denominating that interest "stock."" Substance would be
subordinated to form, despite the long-standing, contrary practice in
the securities area." Therefore, it is submitted that the Court' was
correct in its rejection of the literal approach in determining whether
an interest is a security.
The Supreme Court in Forman did note, however, that the label
affixed to an instrument is not wholly irrelevant." If an interest is
termed "stock" and is coupled with significant characteristics of
stock—right to dividends, negotiability, proportionate voting rights,
possibility of appreciation—a purchaser might reasonably believe that
the interest is a security." In such cases, the Court might justifiably
conclude that the Securities Acts are applicable. The Court found,
however, that the Riverbay shares had none of the traditional charac-
teristics of stock: there was no right to any dividend, the shares were
not negotiable, and they could not be pledged or otherwise
encumbered." Voting rights were not allocated in proportion to the
number of shares owned; and by law the shares could not appreciate
in value." Therefore, the Court reasoned that the Riverbay shares
were not the type of interest which could mislead a purchaser into be-
"° C. N. S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir.
1975); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
930 (1975); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973). But see 1050 Ten-
ants Corp. v. Jakobson, 503 F.2d 1375, 1378 (2d Cir. 1974), where the Second Circuit
relied upon its previous decision in Forman, 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421
U.S. 837 (1975).
" 1 Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1973).
"2 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1970); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1970).
83 Cf. Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), where
the converse situation was presented. There, shares evidenced by certificates expressly
stating that they did not represent ordinary corporate stock were found to come within
the ambit of the Securities Acts, Id. at 137-38.
" See 'l'cherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S: 332, 336 (1967); Rowey, 328 U.S. at 298.
"[Slubstance governs rather than form ... just as some things which look like real estate
are securities, some things which look like securities are real estate." 1 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATIONS, 493 (2d ed. 1961).
s* 421 U.S. at 850-51.
" Id.
"Id. at 851.
88 Id.
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lieving he was purchasing the type of stock that constituted a
security."
The Court's ruling that the Riverbay shares do not constitute
"stock" appears correct. While restrictions on the use of shares may
not be dispositive in determining whether the shares are securities,"
when coupled with the purchasers' intent to acquire low-cost housing
for personal use these features appear sufficient to prevent the shares
in Riverbay from being considered "stock." The transaction, there-
fore, would not be regulated by the Securities Acts unless the interest
constituted an "investment contract."
In determining whether an investment contract existed, the
Court applied the Howey test—whether there is "an investment of
money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
efforts of others."9 ' Since a cooperative is, by definition, a common
enterprise, and since in a project as massive as Co-op City 92 any "prof-
its" would necessarily come from third party management, 93 the criti-
cal issue was whether the plaintiffs were motivated by a reasonable
expectation of profit to purchase the shares. The Court stated that
"profit" traditionally has been interpreted as "capital appreciation re-
sulting from the development of the initial investment ... or a par-
ticipation in earnings resulting from the use of the investor's funds
...."4 Since the Riverbay shares could not appreciate, 95 the Court
had to determine whether the plaintiffs could have expected any
"profits" in the form of participation in earnings.
•	 The Court examined three possible incidents of equity participa-
tion in Co-op City for such profits: (1) the saving of rent expenses by
the shareholders due to rentals at lower than the market cost; (2) the
right to a personal income tax deduction as a result of cooperative
ownership; and (3) the reduction in monthly rental charges due to in-
come from commercial facilities incidental to Co-op City."" The Court
found that the savings on rent and the right to a tax deduction could
not properly represent profit since they could not be liquidated into
cash." The Court further found not only that any income derived
from the commercial facilities which were part of the project was in-
"u Id.
""See text at notes 42-43 supra,
" 328 U.S. at 501. See text at notes 53-58 supra.
" 3
 See note 5 supra.
93 Although the necessity of solely third party efforts was not at issue in Forman
since the requisite profit was not found, the trend is toward allowing a finding of an in-
vestment contract where the investor's efforts are involved, if the significant efforts are
made by others, SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973), or if the investors contribute only a minimal
amount of participation. 1050 Tenants Corp. v. jakohson, 503 F.2d 1375, 1378 n.5 (2d
Cir. 1974).
" 421 U.S. at 852.
55 ld. at 851.
wild, at 854-57.
9T Id. at 855.
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substantial, but that no representations regarding this prospect had
been made by the promoters." Thus, the Court concluded that the
transaction did not constitute an "investment contract."
Writing for the dissent, Justice Brennan stated that the Forman
transaction was an investment contract, since low rental costs, the right
to a tax deduction, and possible rental reductions did constitute "prof-
its to come solely from the efforts of others."" The dissent argued
that profit could assume the form not only of money earned, as in
appreciation of capital or participation in earnings, but also of money
saved."'" Reasoning that the Securities Acts were intended to protect
investors and should therefore be liberally construed, the dissent
found the majority's distinction between types of economic benefits
too restrictive."'
The economic benefit that must be found before the Howey test
is met, however, is an expectation of profit. The dissent's interpreta-
tion of the Howey "profit" requirement to include savings in essence
replaces "profit" with "benefit." Such a revision of the Howey test
seems inappropriate in view of the Securities Acts' legislative history"'
and subsequent judicial interpretations'° 3 which reflect concern with
transactions involving investor expectation of a monetary return over
and above an initial investment.'" As the district court stated, "it
seems certain that Congress never intended to stretch the scope of the
securities acts outside the commercial world and its fungible valuables,
to the uncharted and unchartable realm of intangible, elusive personal
values where one man's balm may very well be another's bane." 1 "5 It is
submitted, therefore, that the majority was correct in rejecting an ex-
pansion of the requisite profit element of the Howey test to include
monetary savings.
In determining whether the Forman transaction constituted an
investment contract, the Court therefore appears correct in finding a
lack of the requisite profit element of the Howey test. Although the
Information Bulletin circulated to the plaintiffs emphasized the
reasonable price of the housing, 10" low rental rates are riot productive
of profit, and this savings can not be liquidated into cash. The low
rental cost is certainly an economic benefit, but since Howey requires
"" Id. at 855-57.
"" Id. at 861-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting). ,
LOU It!, at 863-64.
11 Id.
"See congressional reports cited in note 33 supra.
"3
 E.g., Harvey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946); Joiner, 320 U.S. 344 (1943).
Even in cases which have been cited as adopting an expansion of profit to in-
clude general economic benefits, it is arguable that there was a possibility of a liquid re-
turn over and above the initial investment. See, e.g., Davenport v. United States, 260
F.2cl 591 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 909 (1959) (salary to come from promise
of job security); SEC v. American Foundation for Advanced Educ. of Ark., 222 F.
Supp. 828 (W.D. U. 1963) (cost of college education).
'°" Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 366 F. Supp. 1117, 113i (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
'°" 421 U.S. at 853-54.
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the expectation of a profit rather than a savings, the rejection of this
benefit as fulfilling the Howey requirement seems appropriate. -
The plaintiffs' right to an income tax deduction, permitted
under section 216 of the Internal Revenue Code, 107 allows tenants in
a cooperative housing corporation to deduct their proportionate share
of the cooperative's tax payments and interest payments made on its
mortgage.'" The size and even the existence of any tax savings thus
depends in the first instance upon a tenant's own income level and
whether he itemizes deductions. 109 The Forman Court noted that any
tax' savings, even if considered profit, would not meet the Howey
requirement that profit must come solely from third party efforts." 9
This reasoning does not consider that it is only through the
managerial efforts of third parties in keeping the cooperative project
within the eligibility requirements of section 216 that the tenants are
eligible for this deduction." Nonetheless, the fact that the potential
deduction is merely a potential saving rather than a liquid return over
and above the initial "investment" is sufficient to prevent this aspect
of cooperative membership from falling within the scope of profit.
In considering whether the commercial facilities" 2 attached to
the project could generate potential profit, the Court initially noted
that these types of facilities are conceptually income generating within
the scope of profit traditionally associated with an investment." 3 Since
the facilities were established merely to provide essential services to
the tenants, however, the Court concluded that there was nothing to
indicate that the facilities were actually intended to be profit
generating.''' Since, under New York law, the Co-op City commercial
facilities could only be appurtenant and incidental to the
development,'" the Court reasoned that any possible income would
be too speculative and insubstantial to bring the transaction within the
ambit of the Securities Acts." 6
"37 [NT. Rev. ConE or 1954, 216.
'" The legislative history of § 216 indicates that this benefit is an incident of
home ownership designed to place tenants "in the same position as the owner of a
dwelling house so far as deductions for interest and taxes are concerned." S. REY. No.
1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1942). See Eckstein v. United States, 452 F.2d 1036, 1047
(Ct. Cl. 1971). Compare INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 216(a) (1970), with id. § 163(a) and id.
164(a)(1).
1 " See 1N•. REV. ConE OF 1954, 63(b).
"" 421 U,S. at 855 n.20.
"' Id. at 862-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Parking spaces, laundry facilities, and professional offices were established as
part of the development. 421 U.S. at 855-56.
" 3 Id. at 856.
"'Id. at 856-57.
" 5 N.Y. Paw. Hous. FIN. LAW § 12.5. (McKinney Supp. 1975-76).
" 11 421 U.S. at 856. Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that the income was
hardly de mininas, since revenues in excess of one million dollars flowed into the corpo-
ration from commercial activities. Id. at 861 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This amount rep-
resented gross income, 421 U.S. at 856 n.22, however, and thus is of little significance
absent information relating to the expenses incurred.
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The Court also based its conclusion that income from the com-
mercial facilities did not satisfy the profit expectation requirement on
the fact that no representations concerning this income had been
made to the purchasers in the Information Bulletin.'" Under the
Joiner approach of examining the economic inducements offered by
the promoters, 118 the Court's decision seems correct; Since no rep-
resentations were made by the defendants, there was no economic in-
ducement of possible income from the facilities. Furthermore, with
regard to the Homey requirement of an expectation of profit by the
tenants, the Information Bulletin had merely noted that if rental
charges exceeded expenses, the difference would be returned to the
tenants as a rebate.'" It appears, therefore, that the Court was cor-
rect in finding that possible income from the commercial facilities was
not sufficient to instill a profit motivation in the purchasers. The exis-
tence of. the commercial facilities, rather than being an inducement
for an investor, served only to enhance Co-op City as a viable residen-
tial project.
The plaintiffs in Forman had also urged an adoption of the Silver
Hills "risk capital" approach in determining whether their shares con-
stituted securities."° The Court declined to adopt this approach,
reasoning that even if it were to do so, the plaintiffs did not take any
significant risk in purchasing the shares in Riverbay since they could
resell their shares for the original cost and recover their initial
investment."' Furthermore, the Court noted, the argument that the
plaintiffs could lose their money if the corporation went bankrupt was
not persuasive since the possibility of bankruptcy in the normal sense
was unrealistic, due to the pervasive state supervision, financing, and
regulation.' 22
It is submitted that the Forman transaction did not possess the
traditional risk capital characteristics described in Silver Hills and sub-
sequent judicial applications of that case. The cases in which courts
have found a security using the risk capital approach have generally
involved transactions where the promoters solicited a substantial
portion of the venture capital for the development of either a
profit-making business or a speculative project, in exchange for an
economic benefit to the investors.'" In the Forman transaction, more
than ninety percent of the cost of the project's development was fi-
nanced by the State.' 24 Furthermore, the economic benefits to be re-
LIT 421 U.S. at 856.
118 See text at notes 47-52 supra.
""42I U.S. at 854,
"°/d. at 857 n.24,
"' Id. See text at notes 12-13 and note 12 supra.
128 421 U.S. at 857 n.24.
" 3 See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal.2d 811, 815-16, 361 P.2d 906,
908-09, 13 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188-89 (1961); State v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc., 52
Hawaii 642, 649.50, 485 P.2d 105, 109-10 (1971); Oregon ex re/. Healy v. Consumer
Business Sys., Inc., 5 Or. App. 19, 30-32, 482 P.2d 549, 555 (1971).
"1 421 U.S. at 857 n.24.
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ceived under risk capital cases have generally included the expectation
of a possible monetary profit by the investor.' 25
 The benefits received
by the plaintiffs, however, were those of money saved incidentally
through the use of residential property.' 29
Moreover, in considering the economic context of the transac-
tion in Forman, the Court approved the essential distinction between a
purchase of a commodity for personal use and an investment for
financial gain.' 27 The SEC in Release 33-5347 128 recognized this in
drawin* careful distinctions between housing units which are used for
producing income and those used primarily as residences.' 29 It is not
suggested that where this element of personal use is involved a trans-
action should automatically be excluded from Securities Acts cover-
age. In such a case, exclusion should be the rule only if there is no
reasonable profit motivation on the part of the purchasers.' 3° The
plaintiffs in Forman, however, were purchasing housing, not invest-
ments. Thus, the Court was correct in ruling that the Riverbay shares
were not securities.
CONCLUSION
In holding that the federal Securities Acts do not apply to shares
in a cooperative housing project not held for investment purposes and
125 In Silver Hills it appears that purchasers could resell their shares for a profit.
55 Cal.2d at 813, 361 P.2d at 907, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 187. The Ninth Circuit adopted a
risk capital approach in El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974), where the investor borrowed money from Nationwide In-
vestment Corporation to invest in mutual funds. In exchange, she signed a note,
pledged the mutual funds and other cash as collateral, and prepaid the interest on the
loan. Id. at 1225. The court held that this transaction constituted an investment contract
because the investor risked her capital in return for the economic benefits of invest-
ment leverage and the tax deduction resulting from the prepaid interest. Id. at 1229.
Her overall objective in the transaction, however, was to make a monetary profit on the
mutual funds. Id.
146 See text at notes 102-106 supra.
" 7 421 U.S. at 858; see id. at 864 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12" See text at notes 68-72 supra.
It° The SEC filed an amicus brief in Forman urging application of the Securities
Acts. Brief For SEC as Amicus Curiae at 5-7, Forman. The views of the agency charged
with administering a statute are traditionally entitled to considerable weight. Investment
Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971). However, since this position con-
tradicted the Commission's statements in Release 33-5347, the Court accorded no spe-
cial weight to the Commission's views. 421 U.S. at 858.59 n.25. See Recent Develop-
ment, 62 Gro, L.J. 1515, 1527 n.62 (1975) and Note, 53 TEN. L. Rev. 623, 628 (1975),
agreeing that under the SEC guidelines, the Commission would not be asserting juris-
diction over shares such as those in Riverbay.
'aO See 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974); Grenader
v. Spitz, [Current] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. V 95,300 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In both cases,
shares of a cooperative housing corporation were found to be "investment contracts"
where purchasers had dual motives of consumption and investment. 10.50 Tenants Corp.,
supra, at 1378; Grenader, supra, 1 95, 300, at 98,528. Those shares, unlike the Riverbay
shares, were capable of appreciation. Compare Forman, 421 U.S. at 851, with Grenader,
supra, 1 95,300, at 98,528 and 1050 Tenants Corp., 503 F.2d at 1378.
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incapable of returning a traditional monetary profit during ownership
or upon resale, the Court leaves the plaintiffs in Forman to pursue
possible state remedies.' 3 ' Certainly purchasers of shares in housing
cooperatives of any type should be protected against fraud by the de-
velopers. The issue in Forman, however, was not whether they should
be so protected, but whether they were protected by federal legisla-
tion. The Court's distinction between consumption and investment,
and its limitation that profit must constitute a liquid return over and
above the investment are appropriate since the Securities Acts were
intended to protect investors and not consumers in general.' 32
SUSAN CHALEEN COOPER
"L Under N.Y. GE N. Bus. LAW § 352-c (McKinney Stipp. 1975-76), the shares in a
cooperative housing corporation arc considered securities. See People v. Cadplaz Spon-
sors, Inc., 69 Misc.2d 417, 330 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sup. Ct. 1972). Other state courts in con-
sidering whether cooperative housing corporation shares are securities have found that
security status does not attach. See Willmont v. Tellone, 137 So.2d 610, 612 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1962); Brothers v. McMahon, 351 III. App. 321, 328-29, 115 N.E.2d 116, 119
(1953); State v. Silherberg, 166 Ohio 101, 106.08, 139 N.E.2d 342, 346 (1956).
132 It has been suggested that the disclosure protections of the Securities Acts do
not provide the best method for insuring that cooperative purchasers are acting on a
well-informed basis; rather, some type of substantive regulation is needed. See Com-
ment, Condominium Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 639, 669-75 (1975).
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